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Abstract: I comment on the methodology used by Klein & Barron for dealing with the question
of insect sentience and I briefly make a proposal of my own. Once it is granted that insects are
sentient, a further question arises: which insects are subject to which states of sentience? Do
insects feel pain, for example? If so, which ones? On the further question, I note, Klein & Barron
have nothing to say.
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One way to try to get a grip on this question is by looking at commonalities between brain
structures in insects and brain structures in animals we all agree are sentient, most notably
ourselves. This is the strategy taken by Klein & Barron (2016). It is sentience to which Klein &
Barron are referring when they use the term “subjective experience,” and as they note, basic
subjective experience is to be distinguished from other forms of consciousness, for example,
higher-order consciousness (awareness that one is subject to such and such a mental state) and
self-reflexive consciousness.
The immediate difficulty for Klein & Barron’s strategy is the lack of any general
agreement as to what it is that makes a state phenomenally sentient. There are theories, to be
sure. The preferred candidate of Klein & Barron is that offered by Merker (2007). Unfortunately,
this functional theory is contentious and those who doubt it will not find what Klein & Barron
say very persuasive. These opponents may well grant that there is a level of functioning of the
sort specified by Merker that is supported by subcortical structures and goes along with
sentience in creatures like us. But why take that to deliver sentience in every creature? After all,
according to many philosophers and some scientists, sentience is one thing, functioning is
another. So, you can have the latter without the former. It could be, then, that in some
creatures, sentience is present once the relevant Merker conditions are met, whereas in others
with neural differences of one sort or another, there is just the functioning and no glimmer of
sentience itself.
It is the absence of an agreed upon theory of sentience that has led some researchers to
take a view like that expressed by Marian Stamp Dawkins (2012) in the passage below:
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“Are animals conscious like us because they have many brain structures in common with
us, or are they not like us because they lack some crucial pathway that prevents them
from going that extra mile into conscious experience? Are they like us but only when we
are using an evolutionary old unconscious route, or does a spark of what we would
recognize as conscious experience flare in even the oldest of brains? On the basis of what
we now know about human consciousness, both of these completely opposite views can
be, and indeed have been, put forward as serious hypotheses.” (p. 91)
An alternative strategy is to investigate animal meta-cognition. If animals behave in ways
that indicate that they have a cognitive grasp of how things appear to them, and not just of how
they are, then the obvious conclusion is that things really do appear to them in various ways.
And if things appear to them, then the animals must be conscious of those things — they must
experience them. This is a strategy proposed by Shea and Heyes (2010) and also by Allen and
Bekoff (1997). What would count as evidence that an animal has a cognitive grasp on how things
appear to it? A complex form of behavior providing such evidence would be using appearances
to deceive other animals. A simpler form of behavior would be recognizing how something
visually appears color-wise (where that appearance is different from the customary and real
color of the thing) and matching the appearance to the real color of something else in order to
get a reward.
In my view, this is a worthwhile and fruitful way to proceed. However, it is important to
be clear on what it shows. If a positive result is obtained, then that is evidence that the animal is
indeed sentient. But if a negative result ensues, what follows is only that higher-order
consciousness has not been found. In such a case, the animal is not cognitively aware that it is
undergoing such and such an experience. But that is perfectly compatible with the existence of
sentience. Surely a one-year-old child can feel pain even though it is incapable of cognizing its
state as painful.
A third strategy is to look at commonalities in behavior between the given animals and
ourselves. Take the feeling of pain, for example. For us, there is a complex pattern of behavior
that goes along with pain and is produced by it. If we can find a similar pattern in other
creatures, that is a defeasible reason for believing that they experience pain too. Like effect, so
like cause. There are defeaters to this reasoning, of course. Suppose, for example, during
autopsy it is discovered that there is no brain in your head at all! That would lead to the
conclusion that even though you behaved during your lifetime as if you had a host of
experiences and feelings just like the rest of us, in reality you were some kind of android robot
whose movements were controlled by others from outside so that it appeared as if you were
conscious and indeed felt pain when in reality this was not so.
The case of insects is not like this. As Klein & Barron observe, there are significant and
interesting commonalities between insect brain structures and those of mammals. So, there is
no immediate defeater from brain function.
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But do insects really behave as mammals do? It depends on the insect and it depends on
the stimulus. One recent experiment (Bateson et al. 2011) supports the hypothesis that
honeybees can feel anxious, for they behave as anxious people do in response to ambiguous
stimuli.1 However, insects generally react very differently from us in response to noxious stimuli.
They do not exhibit protective behavior towards injured parts; nor do they decline to mate or
feed even in the presence of severe abdominal injuries. For example, tse-tse flies ignore
extreme bodily injury and feed even if half-dissected. Further, locusts have been observed to
continue to feed while being eaten by mantises. In general, insects do not react to treatment
that would undoubtedly cause severe pain in mammals (see Eisemann et al. 1984). So, there is
reason to doubt that generally insects feel pain.
It would have been good if Klein & Barron had said some more about the various species
of sentience they take to be present in insects and whether there are large differences here
across the insect realm. Still, I find myself in sympathy with much of their discussion.2
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Bateson and her co-authors resist this conclusion, saying only that the experiment provides evidence that
honeybees can be in a state that is functionally like the feeling of anxiety. I see no reason for their caution. For
more here, see Tye (2016).
2
For a general discussion of insect consciousness, see Chapter 9 of Tye (2016).
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